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Few environmentalists have positive things to say on the impact of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on the environment. WTO legal obligations are frequently cited 
as the most significant impediment to a range of environmental 
initiatives, including notably meaningful international coordina-
tion to combat climate change, particularly through carbon tax 
initiatives, and imposition of electronic waste disposal export 
bans. In this vein, adverse findings of WTO dispute panels on 
environmental conservation measures tend to attract the ire of 
international civil society. The tensions between liberal trade and 
environmental protection can be traced back to the days of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947, which 
pre-dated the WTO. Under the GATT 1947, trade and environ-
ment disputes tended to be resolved through diplomatic chan-
nels. The WTO Agreements were intended to provide a more 
predictable and legalistic means by which to resolve such dis-
putes, in exchange for deeper commitments on domestic regu-
lation, a domain historically deemed off limits to international 
disciplines. Two of these agreements in particular, the Agreement 
on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) and the Agree-
ment on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), 
introduced binding disciplines with serious implications for 
domestic environmental decision-making, a subset of domestic 
regulation. The expectation was that the depolitization of WTO 
disputes would afford more certainty to regulators. This has 
decidedly not turned out to be the case. This paper explores why 
this is so, focusing notably on the role of the WTO and Appellate 
Body Secretariats in shaping domestic regulation jurisprudence 
under the GATT, SPS and TBT Agreements. It argues that the 
Appellate Body has misapplied important features of the SPS 
and TBT Agreements to sometimes wrongly condemn envi-
ronmental regulations, owing to a cognitive bias against trade 
distortions. It argues for an alternative approach that stays more 
faithful to the text of the WTO Agreements.
I. IntroductIon
International economic law and international environmen-
tal law have developed considerably over the past decades. 
The WTO Agreements, the focus of this paper, entered into 
force in January 1995, and set binding disciplines on a range 
of trade-related disciplines ranging from goods and services, 
to investment, intellectual property, and product standards. In 
parallel, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), among other institutions, has served as 
a capable forum to coordinate state action to reduce thematic 
cross-border environmental externalities. Yet, there is surpris-
ingly little formal cross-fertilization between trade and the envi-
ronment. Instead, environmental regulation is typically framed 
in trade literature as derogating from core WTO obligations.
The possibilities for cross-fertilization between both disci-
plines are infinite, and certainly well beyond the bounds of this 
paper. Suffice it to state that these disciplines are not natural 
antagonists: the development of “green” industries can foster 
growth opportunities in new markets.1 Trade measures, in turn, 
can steer states towards cleaner and greener development trajec-
tories.2 The preamble to the GATT, now part of the WTO legal 
framework, contemplates that economic relations should raise 
“standards of living” and lead to “the full use of the resources of 
the world”.3 GATT 1947 drafters thus contemplated decades ago 
that economic growth need not come at the expense of the global 
commons. Despite these provisions, a few years before becom-
ing part of the WTO framework, the GATT Secretariat faced 
sharp criticism from environmentalists and civil society actors 
for its handling of two disputes focusing on United States (US) 
dolphin conservation measures restricting the sale of imported 
tuna products.4 The GATT panels concerned made broad state-
ments seemingly indicating that such conservation measures 
were per se inconsistent with Contracting Parties’ GATT obliga-
tions.5 These panel reports were subsequently not adopted into 
the GATT acquis by the Contracting Parties.
The GATT regulated tariff bindings. By the 1960s, these 
bindings reached levels below which tariff increases from 
applied to bound levels could no longer afford meaningful 
protection to domestic industries. GATT exporters grew increas-
ingly wary of so-called “non-tariff barriers”, such as product 
standards similar in operation to those the US had applied to 
tuna imports.6 During the Tokyo Round of negotiations of 1974, 
GATT Parties pressed for a special negotiating group on stan-
dards.7 This yielded the plurilateral Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade (the Standards Code), which 46 Contracting 
* Ravi Soopramanien is an attorney-at-law. He previously served as a Legal Offi-
cer at both the World Trade Organization and the African Development Bank’s 
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Parties joined.8 The Standards Code inspired further product 
standards negotiations in parallel sessions held by technical bar-
riers and agriculture groups set up during the Uruguay Round of 
negotiations establishing the WTO legal framework.9
Inasmuch as it is common to refer to the WTO legal frame-
work in the singular, it should be borne in mind that the WTO 
Agreements are a series of inter-related and inter-state treaties. 
During the Uruguay Round, these agreements were negotiated in 
15 different working groups, with little to no coordination among 
them initially.10 Towards the close of negotiations, the notion of 
the “single undertaking” gained traction — pursuant to which the 
results of the negotiations were deemed to form a “single pack-
age” joined together by the Marrakech Agreement Establishing 
the WTO.11 This led to a scramble to better coordinate among the 
different agreements, which Members resisted to avoid disturb-
ing the negotiated texts. The SPS and TBT Agreements emerged 
from these negotiations and both regulate product standards. The 
SPS Agreement applies to product standards adopted to protect 
human, animal or plant health from the spread of pests, and from 
dangerous additives, contaminants, toxins, and disease-causing 
organisms contained in foodstuffs.12 The TBT Agreement applies, 
residually, to all other product standards.13 Together, the GATT, 
SPS and TBT Agreements impose measures restricting adverse 
trade impacts of Members’ domestic regulation. Given the ease 
with which any domestic environmental regulation can be con-
strued as restricting trade, the collective reach of these agreements 
to environmental laws is broad.
Environmental regulation can typically distort trade in three 
ways.14 The first is through a complete ban on those imported 
products that produce environmental externalities. 15 The second 
is through a partial ban, on imports using a particular process and 
production method (PPM) resulting in an environmental exter-
nality. Where such PPM is amended or altered to the importing 
Member’s satisfaction, subject products may re-access the rel-
evant market.16 It will become clear in my below discussion of 
relevant WTO jurisprudence, that most trade and environment 
disputes tend to implicate this second distortion, inasmuch as 
complaining Members have a tendency to “frame” a particular 
environmental regulation as having the effect of partially limit-
ing market access to the respondent Member’s domestic mar-
ket. The third is through sanctions, under which all or some of 
a Member’s imports are subject to punitive import restrictions 
following a serious environmental transgression.17 This latter 
category, outside some very limited exceptions,18 runs counter 
to the WTO’s ban on unilateral remedial measures.
This paper will address the scope of environmental regu-
lation under the WTO Agreements. It will do so by reviewing 
WTO dispute settlement reports on environmental regulation 
under the GATT, SPS and TBT Agreements. This paper will 
demonstrate that these reports have followed uniform GATT 
canons of interpretation. This paper posits that the Appellate 
Body, the WTO’s judicial appellate organ, has followed these 
canons of interpretation owing to a cognitive bias exhibited in its 
trade and environment disputes, in favor of GATT-driven princi-
ples that has enabled it to regulate away internal inconsistencies 
in the application of environmental regulations under three very 
different agreements. This paper will conclude that this bias, as 
manifested in recent TBT dispute reports, has resulted in the 
narrowing of the scope of the TBT Agreement beyond whatever 
was intended or foreseen by WTO draftspersons. This paper will 
posit that this is due principally to a human element that is by 
and large ignored in the literature.
Section II will introduce the WTO and Appellate Body 
Secretariats. Section III will discuss prevailing theories on the 
challenges that trade and environment disputes pose to the WTO. 
These theories, most of which were presented over a decade ago 
at the height of WTO dispute settlement activity on environment 
conservation measures, are still influential in trade circles. I 
will outline an alternative explanation for the evolution of this 
activity. Section IV will summarize WTO provisions relevant to 
environmental regulation. Section V will give an overview of the 
Appellate Body’s “guide” to environmental regulation in disputes 
under the GATT, SPS and TBT Agreements. It will demonstrate 
that the Appellate Body has transposed GATT principles into 
later SPS and TBT disputes in a manner that, particularly in the 
case of the TBT Agreement, has blurred important distinctions 
between different sets of obligations. Section VI will conclude 
with recommendations.
II. the Wto And AppellAte body secretArIAts
The WTO is composed of two Secretariats: the WTO and 
Appellate Body Secretariats. The WTO website summarizes the 
WTO Secretariat’s main duties as follows:
“to supply technical and professional support for the 
various councils and committees, to provide technical 
assistance for developing countries, to monitor and 
analyze developments in world trade, to provide infor-
mation to the public and the media and to organize the 
ministerial conferences. The Secretariat also provides 
some forms of legal assistance in the dispute settlement 
process and advises governments wishing to become 
Members of the WTO.”19
The WTO Secretariat supports Member actions in relation 
to the WTO Agreements’ three pillars: negotiations, monitoring 
and dispute settlement.20 The Appellate Body Secretariat, in con-
trast, “provides legal and administrative support to the Appellate 
Body”21, and thus only supports the last of these pillars.22
Negotiations under the first pillar are held under the aus-
pices of the Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC), mandated to 
negotiate deeper market access commitments and binding rules. 
Monitoring under the second pillar is carried out under the Trade 
Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM). Dispute settlement under 
the third pillar is formally governed by the Membership acting 
jointly as the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). There is some-
thing of a fluidity to the three pillars: Members negotiate new 
market access commitments. These and pre-existing commit-
ments are regularly monitored and, where required, enforced by 
WTO dispute settlement. This structure has been reversed lately, 
with Members seeking to push new market access commitments 
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through the backdoor of the third pillar.23 Below, I summarize 
these developments.24
1. the DemiSe oF the neGotiationS pillar
Uruguay Round negotiators, wary of civil society criticism 
and adverse press from the abovementioned GATT panel reports 
condemning US dolphin conservation measures, had hoped that 
a Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) could reach a 
political solution to environmental policy convergence. Sadly, 
the CTE, composed largely of trade bureaucrats operating largely 
behind closed doors, failed to deliver on this task. The CTE 
effectively sought to ‘wish away’ the problem of environmental 
disputes in the WTO by taking the now discredited position that 
Members were unlikely to resort to WTO dispute settlement, 
where alternative dispute settlement mechanisms existed under 
other environmental agreements.25 This is sometimes cited with 
irony in the literature as the CTE’s one meaningful contribu-
tion to the trade and environment polemic.26 As this paper will 
elaborate in some detail, the CTE’s failure, rather than yielding 
a negotiated solution to environmental regulation in the WTO, 
instead forced environmental regulation into the domain of 
WTO dispute settlement panels. The result is that the Appellate 
Body is vested with the final say on the WTO-conformity of any 
such regulation.
The result is that Members adopt environmental laws 
under conditions of uncertainty: such measures are liable to 
challenge by another Member, and to be deemed to violate the 
WTO Agreements by a dispute panel, thus exposing the adopt-
ing Members to trade countermeasures. This uncertainty has 
hindered institutional developments in the fields of international 
economic law and international environmental law. On the 
former, the ease by which Members can trigger dispute settle-
ment procedures stands in contradistinction to the difficulty of 
successfully negotiating new trade disciplines. This has led to a 
collective and progressive loss of faith in the WTO’s ability to 
serve as a forum for deeper multilateral integration, culminating 
recently in the collapse of the Doha Development round of nego-
tiations.27 On the latter, concerns about the WTO-consistency 
of proposed environmental agreements have led to a decline 
in multilateral environmental negotiations — exemplified by 
the slowdown in negotiations in Cartagena over the Biosafety 
Protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity.28
2. the riSe oF the DiSpute Settlement mechaniSm
WTO disputes are governed by the Understanding on rules 
and procedures governing the settlement of disputes (DSU) 
annexed to the WTO Agreements. The DSU recognizes that 
dispute settlement is a “central element in providing secu-
rity and predictability to the multilateral trading system . . . it 
serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under 
the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions 
of those agreements”.29 WTO disputes are formally initiated 
at the request of the complainant Member, in respect of any 
trade-related measure adopted or maintained by the respondent 
Member. These Members must first attempt to reach a negoti-
ated settlement. If they fail to do so the complainant Member 
may request the establishment of a dispute panel, normally 
composed of three trade diplomats. The panel’s final report can 
be appealed to the seven-judge (formally, they are referred to as 
“members”) Appellate Body on issues of law or legal interpreta-
tion.30 Typically, a division composed of three Appellate Body 
members will review a given panel report.31 Nowadays, most 
panel reports are appealed.32
WTO rules on the burden of proof emanate from general 
principles of law, and require the complainant Member to assert 
and prove its claim. A complainant Member will satisfy its 
burden when it establishes a prima facie case, namely a case 
which, in the absence of effective refutation by the respondent 
Member, requires a panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favor of 
the complainant Member.33 Where a complainant Member fails 
to establish a prima facie case, its claim will fail for want of 
meeting the burden of proof.
A panel’s standard of review under the DSU is neither de 
novo, nor total deference: “a panel should make an objective 
assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assess-
ment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and confor-
mity with the relevant covered agreements.”34 For this purpose, 
a panel may “seek information and technical advice from any 
individual or body which it deems appropriate”, including 
notably experts.35 In making findings and recommendations in 
a given dispute, panels and the Appellate Body cannot “add to 
or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered 
agreements.”36 Only Members can do so, by way of authoritative 
interpretations under Art. IX:2 of the Marrakech Agreement. 
The DSU recognizes that WTO dispute settlement is subject to 
this qualification.37 The DSU contemplates that a panel’s role is 
limited to assessing the relative strengths of the arguments pre-
sented by the disputing parties. Panels cannot make law, nor can 
they stray beyond the claims presented to them.
Over time, the Appellate Body has implemented its duty to 
provide ‘security and predictability’ in WTO Members’ treaty 
obligations, under the DSU, in a manner that some would regard 
as running counter to the DSU prohibition against ‘adding to or 
diminishing from’ Members’ WTO treaty obligations. According 
to the Appellate Body, adopted panel reports, while formally 
binding only on the disputing parties, nevertheless “create legiti-
mate expectations among WTO Members, and, therefore should 
be taken into account where they are relevant to any dispute.”38 
Appellate Body reports, further, seem to occupy a status in 
between adopted panel reports and an authoritative interpreta-
tion. In one dispute, a panel departed from “well-established 
Appellate Body jurisprudence clarifying the interpretation of the 
same legal issues”, namely on the use of the so-called “zeroing” 
methodology39 in antidumping investigations. The Appellate 
Body roundly condemned the panel for doing so, and interpreted 
the DSU as requiring a panel “absent cogent reasons” to “resolve 
the same legal question in the same way in a subsequent case.”40
In constraining panels, the Appellate Body introduced stare 
decisis and judicial law making through the backdoor. It bears 
mentioning, in this regard, that the Appellate Body has never 
explicitly reversed itself or openly modified its prior reasoning 
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on a legal question in its more than 20 years of existence.41 This 
may come as a surprise to the reader, given that the seven judges 
serving it do so under staggered four-year terms with the pos-
sibility of only one contract renewal.42 Further, some of these 
judges do not have their primary residence in Switzerland. It 
becomes less of a surprise, however, if the reader considers the 
understated role the Appellate Body Secretariat plays in facilitat-
ing the work of these seven Members. The enduring character 
of Appellate Body jurisprudence would tend to suggest that the 
WTO and Appellate Body Secretariats have a larger role to play 
in facilitating the role of the DSB than has been chronicled in the 
literature. Indeed, the role of both the WTO and Appellate Body 
Secretariats is surprisingly ignored in the literature.43
Formally, panelists and Appellate Body Members rule on the 
outcome of a dispute. They normally do so by consensus, notwith-
standing provisions in the DSU for the issuance of separate or dis-
senting opinions. Panel and Appellate Body disputes are guided 
by the two Secretariats.44 The WTO Secretariat influences panels 
in two important respects. First, while disputing Members can 
agree upon panel composition, they typically do not. WTO liti-
gation is expensive, and can sometimes implicate trade volumes 
reaching towards the billions of dollars. With so much at stake, 
disputing Members will typically request the WTO Director-
General to compose a neutral panel, acting on the advice of his 
staff.45 Second, Panelists are often guided by the legal, factual 
and technical assistance provided by Secretariat staff, notably in 
the form of background papers that digest volumes of prior WTO 
jurisprudence and reams of factual exhibits and party arguments 
into manageable documents.46 This process is repeated, mutatis 
mutandis, by the Appellate Body Secretariat following appeals. 
In most, if not all cases, the authors of the background papers 
prepared for panels and the Appellate Body are senior WTO legal 
counselors who are advocating ingrained views on WTO legal 
doctrine.47 The WTO and Appellate Body Secretariats’ rosters of 
legal officers, some of whom served the GATT Secretariat prior 
to the creation of the WTO, include some of the world’s foremost 
trade law experts. After spending decades servicing dozens of 
WTO disputes, it is inevitable that a number of these experts will 
have developed ingrained views on WTO legal doctrine. Such 
views, it follows, do not easily lend themselves to a reversal or 
modification, from one dispute to the next.48
Below, I illustrate how a cognitive bias towards first-order 
GATT-inspired market access and non-discrimination (what I 
refer to as “first order”) principles that can be found in the ana-
lytical approach and sequencing employed in Appellate Body 
dispute settlement reports on environmental regulation had led 
to a line of jurisprudence that openly struggles with the WTO-
consistency of environmental measures. Before doing so, I sum-
marize alternative theories on trade and environment disputes. 
This literature addresses WTO disputes in the broader framework 
of “trade and” disputes, referring to those disputes that implicate 
regulatory concerns extending well beyond the conventional 
domain of a WTO dispute involving tariffs or quotas. I compare 
these theories to my alternative account for the Appellate Body’s 
analytical approach to environmental regulation.
III. prevAIlIng theorIes on  
“trAde And” dIsputes
“Trade and” disputes have generated a great deal of literature. 
This section will give an overview of how trade scholars perceive 
the problématique of “trade and” disputes in the WTO before 
building on the above discussion of the Secretariats with an 
alternative proposal.49 For ease of reference, I have grouped these 
theories into three distinct categories. I have labeled these the 
Hermetic Shift, the Constitutional Order and the DSU Conflict.
As I will set out below, the Hermetic Shift is premised on 
the fragmentation of international legal disciplines. It questions 
the merit of any convergence of disciplines, given the lack of 
coherence in international relations. The Constitutional Order is 
premised either on the existence of global administrative law or, 
more ambitiously, constitutionalism of international law. Both 
premises consider that international institutions act beyond the 
autonomy conferred upon them by states, by drawing upon a pre-
existing or foundational set of international norms. Both prem-
ises further consider convergence a natural consequence of the 
expanding role of international institutions. The DSU Conflict is 
the most difficult to categorize. It is best defined as premised on 
international legal pluralism: it recognizes the phenomenon of 
convergence, without ascribing it any dominant value.50
1. the hermetic ShiFt
Hermetic Shift theorists consider that international economic 
law was designed to operate in a legal vacuum.51 To them, the 
WTO was not designed to handle trade and environment disputes. 
At its heart, the WTO stems from the dictates of economic theory: 
its free trade rationale is rooted in Adam Smith’s laissez-faire52 
and David Ricardo’s comparative advantage ideologies.53 Its his-
torical development has consequently fallen out of step with those 
of the UN institutions such as the UNFCCC, borne out of comity 
and human rights.54 As one commentator, Donald McRae puts it: 
“at the theoretical level, international trade law and international 
law are in important respects based on different assumptions. 
The organizing principle for the international trading regime is 
the economic theory underlying a liberal trade order, that is the 
principle of comparative advantage; the organizing principle for 
international law, by comparison, is the concept of the sovereignty 
of states . . . International law is built on the fundamental con-
struct of a community of sovereign states whose relations with 
each other is the substance of the discipline — international trade 
law runs counter to that construct and in significant ways acts to 
undermine it.”55
Despite these differences, these two disciplines have con-
verged towards the end of the 20th century. As another com-
mentator, Joost Pauwelyn states: “with the end of the Cold War 
and the accession of many former communist countries to the 
Bretton Woods institutions, the separation [between differ-
ent fields of international law] was no longer self-evident. The 
increased inter-dependence between states and between issue-
areas (e.g., trade and environment, human rights and economic 
development) ma[kes] the strict separation between different 
fields of international law all the more artificial.”56
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Jeffrey Dunoff, in a widely-cited paper, identified subject-
matter convergence as the driver of trade and environment dis-
putes. Writing on the apparent demise of the international trade 
regime, he describes the impact of so-called “trade and”57 issues 
on two trade liberalization models, the realist58 collective action 
model (CAM59) and the liberalist embedded liberalism model 
(ELM60).61 Dunoff illustrated that both models are undermined 
by “trade and” issues. CAM is premised on the failure, in inter-
national relations, that would result if states each acted individu-
ally in economic relations. “Trade and” issues, for Dunoff, frame 
the failure instead as one of uneven distribution in substantive 
international obligations. ELM, which juxtaposes shared 
decision-making in international affairs with a state’s exclusive 
control over domestic affairs, for Dunoff, is undermined as those 
matters deemed domestic and thus reserved to the sovereign 
prerogative of states are instead scrutinized in an international 
forum. “Trade and” disputes thus blur the lines between the 
domestic and international, and render the distinction drawn by 
ELM a false dichotomy.62
Sanford Gaines, another trade scholar, finds that conver-
gence between trade and environmental laws is problematic due 
to the use of the more normative WTO dispute settlement mech-
anisms to induce compliance with non-WTO treaty obligations 
that the DSU is poorly equipped to handle.63 For Gaines, while 
“modern international trade law . . . has the relatively easy task 
of establishing agreed ground rules about when and how gov-
ernments are permitted to or prohibited from adopting national 
policies that interfere with these private transactions or distort 
the terms of market competition that drive the transactions . . . 
environmental law is vastly more complex and contingent than 
trade law: complex because almost every human behavior has 
multiple environmental effects; contingent because regulation 
of those effects depends on our incomplete, ever-changing, and 
irreducibly uncertain scientific understanding of the natural 
world.”64 For Hermetic Shift theorists, the WTO’s trade rules, if 
used to adjudicate non-WTO environmental treaty terms beyond 
the remit of ‘ordinary’ trade matters, will yield outcomes that 
twist and turn the environmental treaty terms.
2. the conStitutional orDer
Constitutional Order theorists consider that the prevalence 
of trade and environment disputes signals the convergence of dif-
ferent legal disciplines in international relations. These theorists 
thus propose a counter-narrative to proponents of fragmentation 
in international law, such as DSU theorists. Beyond this, ‘con-
stitutionalization’65 can mean different things to different com-
mentators — and the debate has been aptly likened to the fabled 
elephant in the hand of six blind men by one commentator.66
Against this caveat, Joseph Weiler and Ernst Petersmann are 
the most frequently cited67 proponents of international constitu-
tionalization. Weiler defines constitutionalization as possessing 
a normative and social element. Writing on the formation of 
the EU, he identified the normative element as the creation of 
a ‘higher’ body of EU law. Weiler credits the European Court 
of Justice with shaping the relationship between community law 
and municipal law as one “indistinguishable from analogous 
legal relationships in constitutional federal states.”68 The social 
element, for Weiler, developed through the progressive forma-
tion of a federalized “European entity.” It is less clear whether 
the normative element is a precondition to the social element. 
However, in later and more doctrinal writing on legitimacy and 
governance, he suggests that the social element is, indeed, the 
“output” of the normative element.69
Writing on the WTO, 70 Weiler found elements of both pres-
ent, but lacking in some important respects. On the normative 
element, he found that the WTO Secretariat did not operate 
completely free from ‘external influences’, by which he [prob-
ably] meant large trading Members’ influence. Weiler attributed 
the lack of institutional independence to shortcomings with the 
WTO’s judicial organs. Weiler considered that the Appellate 
Body’s focus on Oxford English Dictionary definitions to ascer-
tain the “ordinary meaning of words” and treaty provisions in 
disputes, in particular, prevented it from meaningfully engaging 
with the more difficult and systemic issues presented by “trade 
and” disputes — issues capable of shaping the social element, 
leading to an epistemic trade community. 71
For Petersmann, constitutionalization is a rights-based phe-
nomenon.72 Unlike Weiler’s judge-driven model, Petersmann’s 
model is premised on a more substantive notion of federalism 
grounded in Kantian philosophy on individual autonomy and 
freedom. In Petersmann’s view, international relations are con-
ducted against the backdrop of unalterable fundamental rights. 
International trade serves as a conduit for enjoyment of these 
rights: “the fact that most people spend most of their time on 
their ‘economic freedoms’ (e.g. to produce and exchange goods 
and services including one’s labour and ideas) illustrates that, for 
most people, economic liberties are no less important than civil 
and political freedoms.”73 In Petersmann’s view, WTO panels 
can and indeed should adjudicate more candidly on the full range 
of “trade and” disputes, particularly those affecting the environ-
ment, and human rights. [More] Controversially, Petersmann 
views Bretton Woods institutions, spearheaded by the GATT, 
as creating a “right to trade”74 which must be weighed and bal-
anced against these other fundamental rights.75
In later writing, Petersmann would focus on the frag-
mentation of human rights law, with emphasis on disparate 
horizontal and regional instruments, and international economic 
law, through studying the proliferation of bilateral investment 
treaty obligations, to argue for a grander constitutional order 
marshalled by a UN-led collective pursuit of human rights pro-
tection. In this vein, he would emphasize the need for judicial 
cooperation in applying so-called “constitutional methodolo-
gies” to coordinate between judgments of various international 
courts and tribunals.76 Petersmann would likely consider that 
trade and environment disputes in the WTO should be (but aren’t 
presently) adjudicated upon through adherence to uniform can-
ons of international judicial adjudication, to avoid the types of 
fragmentation problems that Hermetic Shift theorists observe in 
relation to environmental regulation disputes.77
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3. the DSu conFlict
The DSU flipped GATT 1947 dispute settlement rules. 
Under the GATT 1947, Contracting Parties could forum shop 
within the GATT,78 and block adoption of an adverse panel 
report owing to the positive consensus rule. This rule required 
all Contracting Parties to vote in favor of a panel report before 
it could become part of the GATT acquis, allowing the losing 
party to block its adoption. Dispute settlement under the GATT 
was thus weak, and Contracting Parties preferred negotiated 
solutions to formal dispute settlement.79 Under the WTO, in con-
trast, a negative consensus rule results in the automatic adoption 
of panel reports, except where all Members block it.80
Under the DSU, further, forum shopping is prohibited due to 
the now-exclusive jurisdiction of WTO panels.81 Panel proceed-
ings are subject to strict time frames, of six months for comple-
tion of panel reports and 60 days for completion of Appellate 
Body reports.82 Once the findings and conclusions in these 
reports are formally adopted by the DSB,83 the latter may rec-
ommend, where appropriate, that the respondent Member bring 
its measures into conformity within a reasonable period of time. 
Upon expiration of this period of time, the complaining Member 
can, in principle,84 seek to retaliate through countermeasures 
by securing permission — from the DSB — to suspend “con-
cessions or other obligations under the covered agreements.”85 
Such retaliation, which is prospective in nature, may be fixed to 
a level “equivalent” to the level of economic harm caused by the 
offending measure(s).86
WTO dispute settlement is thus broad, compulsory, adver-
sarial, and can often result in economic retaliation. DSU Conflict 
Debate theorists focus on the first two aspects. They point out 
that WTO treaty obligations are worded as open-ended pro-
hibitions, violations of which can all too easily be alleged by 
a complainant Member. They also point out that the terms of 
the DSU oblige Members to resort to WTO dispute settlement 
when seeking “the redress of a violation of obligations or other 
nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agree-
ments or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of 
the covered agreements.” 87 This leads them to argue that the 
DSU has ‘attracted jurisdiction’ away from non-WTO treaties. 
Gabrielle Marceau, a WTO legal counselor, phrases the problem 
in the following terms: “a WTO Member may seek redress for a 
violation of a human rights treaty before a human rights court. 
Yet, WTO Members seem to have precluded themselves from 
engaging in any debate on whether human rights courts would 
order remedies having any trade-related impact inconsistent with 
WTO law. At the same time, WTO Members have human rights 
commitments, and all states must respect all their international 
rights and obligations at all times.”88
Eric Posner and John Yoo consider that the DSU’s extensive 
jurisdiction is so broad that it may actually deter sovereign states 
from complying. To back this claim with empirical data, the 
authors use proxy indicators for “effectiveness,” which they con-
cede is a “difficult” measure to apply as a dependent variable. 
Using the proxies of compliance, usage and budget to measure 
effectiveness, the authors submit by means of a strong hypothesis 
that there is a negative correlation between effectiveness and 
independence. A weaker hypothesis reserved by the authors is 
that “there is no evidence for positive correlation between inde-
pendence and effectiveness.” The authors conclude, based on 
findings that Member States are taking conspicuously longer to 
comply with DSB recommendations, that the DSB “will have 
diminished chances of success, as already indicated by steps 
being taken by states to avoid or weaken their jurisdiction.”89
DSU Conflict theorists, without necessarily ascribing any 
value judgments to trade and environment disputes, attribute their 
prevalence in the WTO to a procedural feature of dispute settle-
ment rules. WTO panels, to them, simply have to deal with these 
disputes in the best way possible. Where they stray too far, they 
risk having their recommendations ignored by the losing party.
4. aSSeSSment oF the theorieS anD an  
alternative theSiS
The Hermetic Shift theory considers that panels and the 
Appellate Body do not have the tools to properly adjudicate 
trade and environment disputes under the WTO Agreements. 
The GATT 1947 dispute settlement mechanism gave Contracting 
Parties a way out: the US, it is recalled, voted against adopting 
those adverse GATT panel reports that restricted its ability to 
adopt dolphin conservation measures. Such reports floated 
around the GATT universe thereafter as specious sources of per-
suasive authority: out of sight, and out of mind. Under the WTO, 
however, adoption is the default rule. Every trade and environ-
mental dispute adjudicated by a panel creates new WTO ‘law’ 
that hurts or benefits either economic law or environmental law 
foundations, at the cost of the other, and thus exacerbates frag-
mentation.90 In a similar vein, the DSU Conflict theory posits 
that neither panels nor the Appellate Body really have a choice 
in hearing a dispute: whenever Members frame a complaint as 
a violation of WTO obligations, they must adjudicate upon the 
matters raised therein. The Constitutional Order theory is more 
prescriptive. It considers that fragmentation notwithstanding, 
panels and the Appellate Body should engage with their broader 
roles in an expanding trade or global constitution to resolve 
“hard cases.” That the DSU “attracts jurisdiction”91 is, if any-
thing, indicative of the need for such action.
Empirical evidence supporting any of these theories is weak. 
The Hermetic Shift theory better summarizes the pre-WTO GATT 
1947 position on trade and environment disputes. GATT panels 
were wary that allowing environmental conservation measures 
to pass muster would somehow allow these measures to ‘trump’ 
trade obligations. Yet, as will become clear in my below discussion 
of the SPS and TBT Agreements, these two texts were specifically 
designed with environmental regulation in mind. Rather than view 
such regulation as a threat to the trading system, WTO drafters 
saw the merit in setting some binding rules to limit the discrimi-
natory or disproportionate elements of environmental regulation, 
which panels are in turn meant to enforce. The DSU Conflict 
theory, in turn, is circular — as applied to trade and environment 
disputes, it assumes that any and all environmental measures can 
be framed as a trade measure. Thus, under the expansive terms of 
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the DSU, any environmental measure can be challenged before 
a WTO panel. If this is indeed true, this has more to do with the 
fact that most WTO obligations are drafted as open-ended prohi-
bitions against certain conduct than with the DSU’s compulsory 
jurisdiction clause per se. A further flaw with the DSU Conflict 
theory is that it assumes away the critical role of states in initiat-
ing WTO disputes against trading partners. In the absence of any 
prosecutorial authority vested in the two Secretariats, these states 
are surely more to blame for the expansive reach of the DSU than 
the text of the DSU itself. Lastly, the Constitutional Order theory 
has explicitly been rejected by the Appellate Body, the same body 
meant to be charged with creating an epistemological community 
of free or liberalized traders.92 Leaving this aside, further, Panel 
and Appellate Body reports are filled with claims that are not 
addressed for reasons of “judicial economy”. One would expect 
tribunals in a constitutional setting not to engage in such issue-
avoidance techniques, but rather make sweeping doctrinal state-
ments on trade and environment principles.
I would propose a far more functional theory. Building upon 
my discussion in the previous Section on the role legal officers 
within the WTO and Appellate Body Secretariats, I would posit 
that legal officers advise panels and the Appellate Body through 
the lens of a GATT 1947 lawyer: with a keen eye for circum-
vention of GATT non-discrimination principles, and a sense of 
skepticism, if not measured disdain, towards any measure that 
curtails market access principles.93 This GATT 1947 perspective, 
in turn, filters its way into panel and Appellate Body reports.
Whereas, as previously mentioned, the GATT grew into 
15 separate agreements, the analytical approach to be followed 
by panels did not likewise develop into 15 separate analytical 
approaches. Rather, the analytical approach that WTO and 
Appellate Body Secretariat staff adopt when advising panels and 
the Appellate Body, respectively, stays largely faithful to GATT 
first order principles that we will define below: namely, those 
relating to market access, non-discrimination and necessity, all 
buttressed by a skeptical attitude towards Members’ purported 
justifications for the promulgation of ‘non-tariff barriers’, of 
which environmental regulation formed an historically conten-
tious subcategory.
Iv. domestIc regulAtIon In the Wto
Below, I will compare and contrast GATT disciplines 
relevant to environmental regulation from SPS and TBT disci-
plines. The following Section introduces GATT key disciplines, 
alongside analogous SPS and TBT disciplines. It will seek to 
underline the distinct analytical approach panels are meant to 
adopt when resolving an SPS or TBT dispute.
1. the Gatt94
Scope
The GATT applies, broadly, to any “measure” that nullifies 
or impairs any of its benefit, or frustrates attainment of any of its 
objectives.95 At a minimum, these measures include: “rules and 
formalities in connection with importation or exportation”;96 
“internal taxes and other internal charges, and laws, regulations 
and requirements affecting the internal sale”;97 and measures 
resulting in the “prohibitions or restrictions”,98 of products.99
Market acceSS
Market access under the GATT refers to the elimina-
tion of quantitative restrictions on goods. In the course of the 
negotiations leading up to the Uruguay Round, WTO Members 
had embarked upon a process of tariffication’ of ‘non-tariff ’ 
quantitative restrictions, particularly non-automatic import and 
export licenses, and quotas. The GATT generally prohibits quan-
titative restrictions in form and effect.100 GATT tariff schedules 
follow the World Customs Organization (WCO) Harmonized 
Commodity Description and Coding System (HS).101 Current 
practice allows Members some flexibility in how they subcat-
egorize goods and service commitments in domestic law.102
NoN-diScriMiNatioN: NatioNal treatMeNt (Nt)
NT prohibits WTO Members from treating imported prod-
ucts less favorably than “like” products. 103 This prohibition 
applies to any measure adversely affecting imported products 
in law or in fact. In determining whether a measure adversely 
affects ‘like’ imported products, a WTO dispute panel will typi-
cally assess the extent to which the measure at issue has modified 
the “conditions of competition” in favor of the ‘like’ domestic 
product.104 In this context, likeness, is determined with respect 
to the following four criteria: (a) product end-uses; (b) consumer 
tastes and preferences; (c) physical characteristics; and (d) tariff 
classifications.105
NoN-diScriMiNatioN: MoSt Favored NatioN (MFN)
MFN prohibits WTO Members from treating imported prod-
ucts from some Members less favorably than “like” imported 
products from other Members. Any “advantage”106 granted by a 
Member must be accorded, unconditionally, to other Members, 
whether or not these Members joined the WTO later by acces-
sion, and were thus not party to the original tariff or service 
commitment negotiations.107 As with NT, MFN applies to mea-
sures affording an unfair advantage in law or in fact, unless such 
measures were specifically exempted when commitments were 
initially scheduled.108 Whenever such ‘advantage’ is established, 
a violation of MFN is established with no additional inquiry into 
the “conditions of competition” necessary.109 It bears mention-
ing that in the MFN context, likeness is understood to focus more 
narrowly on physical characteristics and tariff classifications.
GeNeral exeMptioNS
WTO Members may derogate from the three principles 
outlined above, whether for “security interests”,110 or by opera-
tion of the “general exemptions” clauses that allow Members to 
impose trade restrictions “necessary” to protect stated objectives, 
notably the protection of public morals, human, animal or plant 
health, and/or to secure compliance with domestic laws or regu-
lations not otherwise inconsistent with the WTO Agreements.111 
The GATT also allows Members to impose restrictions “related 
to” the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, where 
made effective with reductions in domestic consumption.112 
In all instances, Members must satisfy the requirements of the 
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so-called “chapeau” which requires that the measures at issue 
are “not applied in a manner which would constitute a means 
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction 
on international trade”.113 These standards impart meaning to 
one another, and seek to filter out foreseeable discrimination 
in the application of a measure, as distinct from inadvertent or 
unavoidable discrimination.114
In disputes where the disputing Members are party to 
international law instruments bearing upon any of the relevant 
exemptions, dispute panels and the Appellate Body have shown 
a greater willingness to consider these instruments as satisfying 
the chapeau.115 However, the precise status of non-WTO treaties 
in dispute settlement is unsettled. While the Appellate Body has 
shown itself willing to consider the terms of such treaties where 
the disputing parties are signatories as relevant interpretive con-
text,116 in other disputes it has refused to consider the relevance 
of those treaties that fail to reflect the “common intention of all 
parties”117 . This sets a high bar, particularly when one considers 
that the WTO membership counts certain separate customs ter-
ritories that are otherwise unrecognized under international law.
2. SpS & tbt
Scope
The SPS Agreement applies to all “laws, decrees, regula-
tions, requirements and procedures”118 bearing on human, ani-
mal or plant health risk regulation; sanitary matters arising from 
the risks of entry, establishment and spread of pests, diseases 
or disease-causing organisms or from additives, contaminants or 
toxins in food and feedstuffs; and pest-related damages. Given 
that these operate as a ‘carve out’ from the TBT Agreement, 
SPS measures should be narrowly defined.119 Nevertheless, SPS 
measures have sometimes been interpreted widely to apply to 
the regulation of GMOs and crossbreeds, as ‘pests.’120
The TBT Agreement defines a technical regulation as any 
“document” which lays down “product characteristics or their 
related processes and production methods, including the appli-
cable administrative provisions, with which compliance is manda-
tory.”121 Whether a measure is a technical regulation will turn on 
the extent to which it lays down “product characteristics.”122 A full 
or partial import ban can constitute a technical regulation.123
The default rule is that SPS and TBT Agreements operate 
in mutual exclusion: they cannot apply to the same element of a 
measure.124 In theory, however, they can apply to different ele-
ments of the same measure. 125
NeceSSity teSt & poSt-diScriMiNatioN  
proportioNality StaNdard
The SPS and TBT Agreements both refer to the GATT gen-
eral exemptions clause in their preambles.126 Both agreements 
further the objectives of the GATT in the realm of product stan-
dards. The SPS Agreement, by its terms, authorizes Members to 
adopt only those measures necessary to protect human, animal 
or plant health, provided they are backed by “sufficient scientific 
evidence”.127 The TBT Agreement is broader than the GATT in 
allowing Members to pursue any “legitimate objectives”, which 
a panel must assess against the “risks non-fulfillment would cre-
ate.”128 An important distinction is that while the GATT general 
exemptions clause is, by its terms, an affirmative defense for a 
respondent Member to invoke to show that its contested mea-
sures were “necessary” to achieve a stated objective, the SPS 
and TBT Agreements frame the necessity requirement as an 
obligation of the complainant.129
Importantly, both Agreements go beyond the GATT general 
exemptions clause in requiring Members to adopt standards that 
are “not more trade-restrictive than necessary”.130 These com-
mon provisions contemplate that an SPS or TBT measure can 
be found to violate WTO law even if they do not discriminate, 
in law or in fact, against imports. Specifically, they can be found 
to be WTO-inconsistent if a less trade-restrictive measure is 
available. Such measure must be both technically and economi-
cally feasible to implement, and achieve the respondent’s stated 
level of protection. This proportionality standard thus embodies 
a “post-discrimination” standard, which extends the reach of 
the SPS and TBT Agreements beyond the reach of GATT non-
discrimination principles.131
HarMoNizatioN aNd tHe role oF  
iNterNatioNal StaNdardS
The SPS and TBT Agreements encourage Members to 
harmonize standards.132 To incentivize Members to harmonize 
on a broad basis, the agreements afford safe harbor to standards 
that are “based on” relevant international standards.133 The 
agreements differ on the parameters of this safe harbor. The SPS 
Agreement deems all domestic regulation “in conformity with” 
existing international standards to pass the necessity test, and 
presumes them to be consistent with the WTO Agreements as a 
whole.134 The TBT Agreement requires Members to use existing 
international standards “as a basis” for their technical regula-
tions, unless such standards are “an inappropriate or ineffective 
means to achieve” their legitimate objectives.135 However, the 
TBT Agreement presumes all conforming measures to be con-
sistent only with its terms, and not, for instance, with the GATT.
The SPS Agreement defines “international standards” 
restrictively as those adopted under the aegis of the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, the World Organization for Animal 
Health (OIE) and the International Plant Protection Convention 
(IPPC).136 Under the TBT Agreement, on the other hand, whether 
a standard qualifies as an “international standard” turns on an 
enquiry of the issuing “international standardization body”, 
which must be a body with recognized activities in standardiza-
tion, whose membership is open to at least all WTO Members.137 
Neither the SPS nor the TBT Agreement requires qualifying 
standards to be adopted by consensus. This seems to confer on 
relevant international bodies some quasi-legislative status under 
the WTO.138
leSS Favorable treatMeNt (Nt & MFN)
The SPS and TBT Agreements both contain combined ref-
erences to MFN and NT. The SPS Agreement requires Members 
to adopt measures that do not “arbitrarily or unjustifiably 
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discriminate between Members where identical or similar con-
ditions prevail, including between their own territory and that 
of other Members.”139 Similarly, the TBT Agreement requires 
“treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products 
of national origin and to like products originating in any other 
country”.140
It is recalled that SPS standards protect living organisms 
from pests or diseases in foodstuffs. SPS measures are thus tai-
lored to specific risks, expressed, in terms of a Member’s stated 
level of protection. This level of protection is typically gauged in 
terms of the residual risk that remains following implementation 
of an SPS measure.141 Depending on how low the residual risk 
is set, an SPS measure can affect a range of products even in the 
absence of any competitive situations. Likeness under the SPS 
Agreement is thus assessed in relation to the levels of residual 
risks set in analogous situations, which in essence focuses on 
the regulatory purposes behind SPS measures.142 In practice, 
likeness is nary a live issue in in SPS disputes — rather, it tends 
to be assumed, for the reason that no respondent Member will 
want to argue that the risks posed by the underlying imported 
goods are unrelated to the risks redressed by its contested mea-
sure. Though literature is sparse on this point, it is submitted that 
doing so would likely signal the absence of any SPS-compliant 
justification for the resulting market access restriction, and thus 
result in an admission of a GATT violation.
TBT product standards can also apply to analogously 
wide product groups, for instance in relation to carcinogen 
warning labels. It can thus be argued that the “like” product in 
both agreements should also be assessed primarily against the 
regulatory purpose of the relevant measure.143 This becomes 
particularly compelling if we recall that the same measure can 
have divisible SPS and TBT components:144 to assess the SPS 
component of this measure as applying to a product group dif-
fering in scope from the TBT component of the same measure 
would be anomalous. Yet, panels have been instructed by the 
Appellate Body to approach likeness under the TBT Agreement 
primarily with reference to the four GATT competitive relations 
factors.145 As I will discuss below in my discussion of Appellate 
Body jurisprudence, an inquiry into regulatory purpose under 
the TBT has been limited to a non-discrimination analysis of 
“even-handedness” between imported and domestic products (a 
concept borrowed from the GATT chapeau).146
v. the AppellAte body’s guIde to  
Wto-consIstent domestIc regulAtIon
The sequencing of an SPS/TBT analysis differs from that of 
a GATT analysis. Whereas a GATT panel will first assess whether 
there is a market access or non-discrimination violation, followed 
by consideration of the necessity justifications put forward by the 
respondent Member, a proper SPS/TBT analysis should proceed 
in the reverse order. This is because both agreements presume, 
to some degree, that domestic regulation will distort trade. Such 
sequencing, further, stays faithful to the object and purpose of the 
SPS and TBT Agreements, which, it is recalled, are elaborations 
of the GATT’s ‘general exemptions’ clause.
Under this approach, a complainant Member should first 
substantiate its claim that a respondent Member’s SPS or TBT 
measure is not necessary to achieve its stated purpose, through 
identification of a lesser trade-restrictive alternative measure, 
with those alternative measures conforming to a relevant inter-
national standard being the most compelling. Importantly, it is 
incumbent on the complainant Member to make its case, by sat-
isfying applicable rules on the burden of proof.147 Only when it 
does so should the respondent Member provide justifications for 
the contested measure, including rebutting the appropriateness 
of any suggested alternative measures proffered by the com-
plainant Member. A SPS or TBT panel should first consider the 
necessity of the contested measure as a threshold issue, before 
assessing whether or to what extent the measure accords less 
favorable treatment to imports. Importantly, beyond an assess-
ment of necessity, the DSU does not authorize panels to evaluate 
the appropriateness of the contested measure in the abstract. 
They may only do so where they determine that the complainant 
Member has made a prima facie showing of WTO-inconsistency. 
Where a contested SPS or TBT measure is not necessary, more-
over, no further enquiry into less favorable treatment, discrimi-
natory or otherwise, is warranted. Its trade-restrictive impacts 
become disproportionate, notwithstanding this further enquiry.
Below, after summarizing the Appellate Body’s GATT 
analysis, I will show that, in spite of the important distinctions 
summarized above, the Appellate Body’s SPS analysis has 
ignored proportionality altogether. The Appellate Body’s TBT 
analysis, further, not only ignores the proportionality standard: 
it ignores the proper sequencing of a TBT dispute and is, effec-
tively, tainted by the wholesale importation of material elements 
of the Appellate Body’s conventional GATT analysis.
1. Gatt
Building upon decades of GATT jurisprudence, environmen-
tal regulation resulting in a complete or partial ban on imports are 
almost mechanically found to violate GATT provisions on MFN, 
NT and/or market access, except in those circumstances where the 
“likeness” between imported and domestic products is less clear-
cut.148 In those instances, a close analysis of physical characteris-
tics, and tariff classifications (in addition to product end-uses and 
consumer tastes and preferences, in the NT context) may compel 
a panel to find no violation, on the basis that the products at issue 
are not alike. In a typical GATT dispute, however, framing a viola-
tion as a quantitative restriction, such as a full or partial import 
ban, or regulatory discrimination through establishing likeness 
under NT or MFN, and subsequent treatment less favorable, is 
straightforward for a complainant Member.
NeceSSity
In such disputes, the final outcome will normally hinge on 
whether such regulation can satisfy both limbs of the necessity 
analysis contained in the ‘general exemptions’ clause. This clause 
requires, first, that there be a nexus between the measure and the 
stated objective and, second, that the measure passes the ‘chapeau’ 
test of even-handed application. The nexus under the first limb is 
expressed either in terms of a “necessity” threshold, where the 
13Fall 2016
stated objective relates to the protection of public morals, human, 
animal or plant health, or to secure compliance with domestic 
laws or regulations not otherwise inconsistent with the WTO 
Agreements, or as a “related to” threshold for the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources. Such natural resources have been 
interpreted, broadly, to apply to “clean air”149 and sea turtles.150 
“Necessity” is a tougher threshold to meet than “related to”. It 
requires a “material” contribution to the achievement of the stated 
objective.151 In an assessment of this nexus, “the contribution of 
the measure has to be weighed against its trade restrictiveness, 
taking into account the importance of the interests of the values 
underlying the objective pursued”.152 An assessment of measures 
“related to” the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, in 
contrast, hinges on a “close and genuine relationship of ends and 
means.”153 Typically, respondent Members have not faced difficul-
ties meeting either relational threshold.
tHe cHapeau: eveN-HaNdedNeSS aNd itS liMitS
Respondent Members have fared worse under the chapeau 
test. The chapeau, it is recalled, filters out discrimination in the 
way that the contested measure is applied. It addresses a form of 
discrimination that is unrelated to the violation of, for instance, 
MFN or NT.154 The chapeau has been met successfully in one 
dispute to date, involving US sea turtle conservation measures 
restricting the sale of imported shrimp products.155 In the original 
proceedings, the Appellate Body found elements of “unjustifiable 
discrimination” in the conservation measures, for allowing cer-
tain Members longer grace periods to adapt to the measures than 
others,156 and “arbitrary discrimination” in the manner in which 
certification decisions under the measures were undertaken with 
respect to certain Members with zero to comparatively low acci-
dental takings of sea turtles.157 More broadly, the Appellate Body 
was critical of the failure by the US to engage in “serious, across-
the-board negotiations with the objective of concluding bilateral 
or multilateral agreements for the protection and conservation of 
sea turtles” before “enforcing the import prohibition against the 
shrimp exports of those other Members.”158
In ensuing compliance proceedings, the US streamlined its 
certification process and engaged in bilateral and regional sea tur-
tle conservation negotiations, while maintaining an import ban on 
South Asian shrimp. Malaysia, one of the principal complainants, 
argued that the US was obliged to successfully conclude negotia-
tions prior to maintaining its measures. The Appellate Body dis-
agreed, finding that such a requirement had no basis in the GATT 
or chapeau.159 The US effectively pushed the Appellate Body’s 
reasoning to its natural limits, by complying with the Appellate 
Body by removing all discriminatory and arbitrary aspects of its 
impugned conservation measures. Once it did so, the Appellate 
Body had little choice but to accept that the US had complied with 
its earlier recommendations, at the risk of otherwise adding an 
onerous and ultra vires requirement that states conclude negotia-
tions before they can meet the chapeau test.160
Since these proceedings, complainant Members have 
stopped litigating environmental measures primarily under the 
GATT — possibly for fear that the Appellate Body had revealed 
a blueprint for evading GATT chapeau disciplines. They have 
turned instead to the SPS and TBT Agreements. In more recent 
years, GATT claims have featured as subsidiary claims that are 
only assessed in those rare instances where contested measures 
fall outside the broad scope of the SPS and TBT Agreements.161
aSSeSSMeNt
Under the GATT, panels must first determine whether there 
has been a substantive treaty violation. If a panel finds a viola-
tion, the environmental regulation’s compliance with the WTO 
standard will depend on whether the respondent Member can 
demonstrate that the regulation is applied even-handedly between 
different Members, and between imports and like domestic 
products. Such a finding, coupled with good faith negotiations 
that achieve an international consensus on the underlying policy 
objective, can clear the chapeau hurdle.162
2. SpS
The narrow definition of an SPS measure suggests that the 
SPS Agreement was not designed to apply to environmental 
regulation per se, but rather to a subset of food and feed regu-
lation.163 That said, the SPS Agreement can apply, and indeed 
has applied, more broadly to those environmental risks that are 
regulated by WTO Members as a food and feed regulation. This 
has been the case with the EU and its legal frameworks for hor-
mones and GMOs.164
Where SPS disciplines apply and the complainant Member 
has made a prima facie showing of inconsistency with a provi-
sion of the SPS Agreement, the Appellate Body begins with an 
assessment of the measure’s necessity. Necessity can be dem-
onstrated by a respondent Member in two ways. First, where an 
SPS measure conforms to a qualifying international standard. It 
is recalled, in this respect, that the SPS recognizes a closed list of 
qualifying international bodies.165 Second, Members can diverge 
from international standards and satisfy necessity by showing 
that the measure is “based on” a scientific justification or a risk 
assessment.166
No clear GuideliNeS oN tHe proportioNality StaNdard
Most SPS disputes on environmental regulation to date 
have focused on this second avenue. Factors relevant to conduct-
ing the required risk assessment include: “relevant inspection, 
sampling and testing methods; prevalence of specific diseases 
or pests; existence of pest- or disease-free areas; relevant eco-
logical and environmental conditions; and quarantine or other 
treatment.”167 Appellate Body decisions on these cases have 
highlighted two features. First, such Members may factor socio-
political considerations into their risk assessments. This is sur-
prising, as such considerations logically feature more naturally 
in risk management, an altogether separate inquiry. Risk man-
agement, while not expressly addressed in the SPS Agreement, 
finds some expression in those provisions on a Member’s stated 
or desired regulatory level of protection.168 Second, while gen-
eral WTO transparency-related considerations require that a 
WTO Member’s stated or desired regulatory level of protection 
be sufficiently discernible from surrounding circumstances, the 
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Appellate Body has accepted, somewhat counter-intuitively, that 
ambiguities in defining their level of protection may actually 
insulate respondent Members from a finding that a less trade-
restrictive alternative measure exists.169 These two factors may 
suggest that the Appellate Body has blunted the application of 
the proportionality standard to its SPS analysis.
eveN-HaNdedNeSS: No liMitS
I predicate that the Appellate Body’s findings on a Member’s 
level of protection may have blunted the application of the pro-
portionality standard as the Appellate Body has never actually 
moved far enough along in its SPS analyses to apply it. Instead, 
it has incorporated into its necessity assessment a requirement 
that panels assess the even-handedness of an SPS measure in 
a manner analogous to that required under the first limb of the 
GATT necessity analysis. While meeting the relational threshold 
is easy for respondent Members in a GATT dispute, in the SPS 
context it calls upon respondent Members to adduce clear sci-
entific evidence. Where the adduced by the respondent Member 
is ambiguous, panels will actively solicit the views of experts 
on the proper application of SPS measures.170 These experts, 
in turn, have provided assessments that panels have, at times, 
cherry-picked from to question the merits of the underlying sci-
entific basis for a contested measure, and the reasoning of the 
risk assessor based on the available science.171 The Appellate 
Body has regularly upheld panels’ factual determination that 
the respondent’s scientific justifications in a given dispute have 
been found lacking, either due to the lack of specificity of 
studies relied upon172 or ambiguities as between the scientific 
conclusions and the SPS measure, or the SPS measure and the 
respondents’ stated levels of protection.173 The Appellate Body 
has done so, while accepting that Members’ may base their SPS 
measures on non-mainstream science.174
aSSeSSMeNt
Under the SPS Agreement, the WTO-consistency of envi-
ronmental regulation, surprisingly, does not hinge on a propor-
tionality standard. This is odd, given the possibility that Members 
have of basing SPS measures on a range of non-mainstream 
or majority science.175 Such a standard would have required a 
complainant Member to establish that the respondent Member’s 
environmental regulation is more trade restrictive than necessary 
to achieve the respondent Member’s stated level of protection. 
Instead, the Appellate Body has directed that environmental reg-
ulation be first assessed against a searching necessity analysis, 
culminating in an examination of the relational nexus between 
contested measure and stated objective based on the first limb 
of a GATT necessity analysis. This examination assesses a mea-
sure’s relational links to underlying scientific justification, and 
the respondent Member’s stated level of protection. All other 
things being equal, such a heightened necessity analysis will 
tend to disfavor the respondent Member, in prompting it to show 
that its measure meets a scientific certainty test in a manner that, 
effectively, relieves the complainant Member of any obligation to 
show a reasonable alternative measure in the course of proceed-
ings. Ironically, while this favors the complainant Member in the 
short term, it works to its disadvantage in the medium to long 
term, inasmuch as the lack of any readily identifiable reasonable 
alternatives creates ambiguities in compliance proceedings that 
can be exploited by the respondent Member.176
It bears mentioning that the lack of environmental disputes 
litigated under the SPS Agreement since issuance of a panel report 
on GMOs bears possible testimony to the over-stringency of SPS 
disciplines. While evidence on this point is anecdotal, respondent 
Members seem to prefer framing environmental regulation as TBT 
measures rather than SPS measures.177 Complainant Members, 
for reasons I will elaborate upon below, are only too happy to base 
their claims under the TBT Agreement.
3. tbt
It bears noting at the outset that, while the Appellate 
Body has drawn a relatively clear line between environmental 
regulations regulated by the SPS Agreement as distinct from the 
GATT,178 precisely where the line is drawn between an environ-
mental regulation that is a TBT technical regulation as distinct 
from a GATT measure is currently an open question.179 This 
is exacerbated by the lack of any clear guidance on whether a 
measure deemed consistent with one preempts a violation of the 
other.180 It bears emphasizing that such ambiguities would have 
been avoided altogether if the Appellate Body had followed its 
SPS sequencing, and reversed its TBT analysis to first analyze 
the necessity of the TBT measure. This would have allowed the 
Appellate Body, where a contested measure is alleged to violate 
both the GATT and TBT Agreements, to begin a TBT analysis 
where its GATT analysis closes.
Be that as it may, current ambiguities allow a complainant 
Member to frame GATT challenges to environmental regula-
tions under the [slightly] more stringent disciplines of the TBT 
Agreement. In this vein, the Appellate Body recently disposed 
of a spike of TBT appeals on a US ban on clove cigarettes, a US 
dolphin conservation measures restricting the sale of imported 
tuna products, US country of origin labeling requirements for 
imported meat products, and an EU restriction on seal fur and 
other byproducts181.
tHe Gatt approacH yieldS itS liMitS
The Appellate Body’s TBT analysis, as mentioned above, 
does not begin with a necessity analysis. Instead, the Appellate 
Body reverted in its recent TBT decisions to its GATT analysis. 
It thus starts its enquiry with a determination of product like-
ness, and an assessment of whether the contested measure treats 
imported products less favorably than like imported or domestic 
products. Likeness, in this context, does not follow an SPS-type 
analysis of regulatory purpose, but rather mirrors GATT-type 
competitive relations factors.182 Where less favorable treatment 
is established, the Appellate Body directs additional enquiry 
into whether this treatment “stems exclusively from legitimate 
regulatory distinctions.”183 This additional enquiry, which finds 
no textual basis in the TBT Agreement, draws upon elements of 
the GATT NT and chapeau provisions, and requires a respondent 
Member to show that its measure is properly “calibrated” to the 
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risks it seeks to mitigate.184 In practice, all TBT measures to date 
have failed this amorphous ‘calibration’ test.
In a development that parallels the above-cited GATT 
dispute concerning US sea turtle conservation measures, how-
ever, the Appellate Body’s most recent TBT decision, issued in 
end-November 2015, saw the US come within paragraphs of 
passing the ‘calibration’ test in recourse proceedings relating 
to the latest installment of the dolphin conservation measures 
that had so troubled GATT panel over two decades earlier. In the 
original proceedings, the US measure had been found to subject 
tuna harvesters within the Eastern Tropical Pacific (ETP) to less 
onerous certification requirements than tuna harvesters outside 
the ETP, despite both groups of harvesters posing equal risks 
to dolphin populations.185 The US had amended its measure 
to require additional certification outside the ETP in situations 
involving the existence of “regular and significant association 
between dolphins and tuna”, but not upon existence of “regular 
and significant mortality or serious injury of dolphins”. The 
Appellate Body found that this regulatory distinction reflected a 
lack of even-handedness, inasmuch as the risks to dolphins from 
both situations was comparable.186
While the US lost the appeal, it can comply with the 
Appellate Body’s ruling through cosmetic amendment to its 
certification requirements, which the Appellate Body will be 
precedent-bound to ratify as TBT consistent in any follow-up 
compliance proceedings. Having zeroed in on the Appellate 
Body’s GATT-style legal analysis, the US, as it did in the above-
referenced shrimp dispute again pushed the Appellate Body to 
the limits of its non-discrimination analysis, by chipping away at 
all but one of those aspects of its conservation measures that the 
Appellate Body had deemed improperly ‘calibrated’. Had the 
Appellate Body steered closer to the text of the TBT Agreement, 
by focusing less on discrimination (as there was none present) 
and more on the feasibility of lesser trade-restrictive alternatives, 
it could have availed itself of some of the lesser trade-restrictive 
alternative measures proposed by the complainant, Mexico, to 
strike down the US measure on other grounds. As I will elaborate 
upon below, however, the Appellate Body has instead elected to 
distance itself from the proportionality standard in TBT case law.
tHe better aNalytical approacH
Pursuant to an SPS-type analysis, which it at one stage 
seemed to follow in earlier TBT disputes,187 the Appellate Body 
should have started its enquiry with a necessity analysis, either 
by examining relevant international standards cited by the com-
plainant, or by assessing the extent to which the measure at issue 
is based on a legitimate objective.
Most TBT disputes have focused on the relevance of an 
existing international standard. A complainant Member here 
must do more than show that a relevant standard exists. It must 
also show that the standard is “appropriate” and/or “effective” 
to achieve the respondent Member’s legitimate objective.188 A 
respondent Member could challenge the standard on the basis 
of climactic particularities or technology gaps, or because it 
aspires to more stringent standards than the international 
standard — reflecting it’s stated or desired regulatory level of 
protection in the TBT context.189
Were a Member to diverge from relevant international stan-
dards, it would need to satisfy a necessity standard, by show-
ing, as required in an SPS analysis, that the measure is based 
on a legitimate objective. The starting point in a panel’s analysis 
here would not be the TBT provision addressing less favorable 
treatment, teeing up the free-standing calibration test, but rather 
the proportionality provision requiring Members to adopt TBT 
measures that are the least restrictive to trade.190 No additional 
enquiry into less favorable treatment should be required where 
the measure at issue is deemed disproportionate.
aSSeSSMeNt
Under the TBT Agreement, the WTO-consistency of envi-
ronmental regulation turns on the respondent Member’s satisfy-
ing a GATT chapeau-style even-handedness assessment. This is 
because the Appellate Body has largely framed its TBT analysis 
in the same terms as its GATT analysis. The result, it is submitted, 
is the transformation of the TBT into a ‘GATT 2.0’, where the 
burden of proof favors the complainant Member, and contested 
measures are unlikely to survive the a freestanding ‘calibration’ 
test. Though this calibration test is no less exacting than the 
even-handedness test applied in the SPS context, a potentially 
infinite range of international standards and the absence of any 
pervasive requirement to adduce supporting scientific justifica-
tion seems to make litigating environmental regulation under the 
TBT Agreement the more attractive of the three agreements for 
complainant and respondent Members alike.
As with its SPS case law, the Appellate Body’s introduc-
tion, in its TBT jurisprudence of an even-handedness analysis 
has blunted application of the proportionality standard.191 
Accordingly, the Appellate Body has been slow to accept less 
restrictive alternative measures proposed by complainant 
Members, where these find no basis in existing international 
standards.192 It has instead shown total deference to respondent 
Members’ stated or desired regulatory levels of protection. Where 
proposed alternatives fail to achieve these stated levels, however 
artfully or fancifully expressed, the contested measure cannot be 
considered more trade-restrictive than necessary. Thus, in one of 
the rare cases where the Appellate Body addressed an alternative 
measure — albeit one based on an international standard — it 
reversed the panel’s findings to hold that Mexico’s proposal that 
a tuna label certifying that no dolphins were killed by harvest-
ing methods fell short of the broader US concern that dolphins 
not be harmed by these methods.193 Though these objectives 
were unquestionably different, there was surely some common 
ground between both sets of objectives for the Appellate Body 
to maneuver to identify a suitable compromise measure on the 
record before it.
Under my proposed analytical approach, the US’ stated 
level of protection would have been subject to a more searching 
assessment,194 where a panel would have weighed the contested 
certification requirement against a range of other possible alter-
native measures adduced by Mexico. Were the US’ certification 
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requirement to yield disproportionate trade-restrictive impacts, 
this would not necessarily be the end of the matter:195 assuming 
the respondent Member puts forward a plausible justification for 
the necessity of the trade-restrictive impacts, the WTO inconsis-
tency of the measure would hinge on the existence of an equally 
efficient yet less trade restrictive alternative. If a complainant 
Member could establish the viability of such an alternative, 
the contested measure would be deemed WTO-inconsistent. 
Otherwise, the respondent Member should be presumed to be 
acting in a WTO-consistent manner. This analysis would be more 
accommodating to the concerns addressed in the United States’ 
dolphin conservation measure, while staying more faithful to the 
text of the TBT Agreement.196
vI. conclusIon
The Appellate Body, through adherence to uniform GATT 
cannons of interpretation, has belied the lack of internal coher-
ence in the various WTO Agreements. In so doing, it has 
succeeded in maintaining rigid limits on Members’ abilities 
to lawfully circumvent any and all WTO treaty obligations. 
Laudable as this may be, given the WTO’s recent struggles to 
push anything meaningful through its negotiating pillar as of late, 
the problem is that the Appellate Body has not acted pursuant 
to any clear mandate from the WTO membership. Some would 
argue that this unbridled judicial activism may have recently 
caught up with the Appellate Body, following the US’ decision 
to block re-appointments of sitting Appellate Body members 
that it deemed had failed to properly execute their functions in 
the course of their first term, notably due to their ‘questionable’ 
stance on aspects of US trade remedies legislation.197 Though 
this impasse was eventually crossed after months of internal 
tussles in the DSB,198 the timing is ripe to rethink the Appellate 
Body’s approach to WTO dispute settlement.
When reviewing the above jurisprudence on environmental 
regulation, we see that the Appellate Body has imported key 
elements of its GATT necessity analysis into its SPS and TBT 
jurisprudence. In its SPS case law, the most critical analytical 
element, the assessment of the relational nexus between the 
contested measure and the stated objective, is lifted from the 
first limb of the Appellate Body’s GATT necessity analysis. Case 
law has yet to reveal whether the second limb will feature in an 
SPS analysis. Similarly, in its TBT case law, which otherwise 
replicates the Appellate Body’s GATT analysis in full, the most 
critical analytical element, the assessment of a contested mea-
sure’s ‘calibration’, draws from the second limb of the Appellate 
Body’s GATT necessity analysis. No analysis of the first limb 
precedes this calibration test. It is curious that the Appellate 
Body has ostensibly severed the GATT necessity analysis 
between the two agreements in such a manner. Moreover, while 
the Appellate Body seems to follow proper sequencing in its SPS 
rulings, by starting with a necessity analysis before, presumably, 
following through with a proportionality assessment, it does 
not do so in its TBT rulings. This is surprising, given that the 
TBT Agreement is structured much more closely with the SPS 
Agreement, and should be identified more closely with the latter.
The Appellate Body has thus narrowed the scope of the SPS 
and TBT Agreements, effectively aligning them with GATT-type 
market access, non-discrimination and necessity principles. 
Doing so, however, has yielded some unintended consequences: 
chief among them being that it becomes difficult to demarcate 
precisely where a GATT analysis ends and a TBT analysis 
begins. It would seem that a technical regulation under the GATT 
is anything short of a product ban that fails to lay down any 
discernible “product characteristics.”199 In this sense, the TBT 
Agreement does not seem to apply as holistically to quantitative 
restrictions. Further, the TBT Agreement allows Members to 
pursue an open-ended list of “legitimate objectives”. Members 
seeking to legislate for objectives beyond those enumerated in 
the GATT ‘general exemptions’ clause will thus continue to avail 
themselves of the ability to do so under the TBT Agreement.
These factors, however, represent the ‘outer limits’ of the 
GATT and the TBT Agreement. How the Appellate Body will 
handle a conflict between GATT and TBT disciplines where they 
overlap becomes unclear. One can fathom of a situation where 
a complainant Member challenges a measure that the respon-
dent Member seeks to justify with reference to a TBT-consistent 
objective that is not listed under the GATT general exemptions 
clause; or, where such complainant Member challenges the 
relevance of an international standard cited by the respondent 
Member to benefit from the TBT Agreement’s ‘safe harbor’ in a 
GATT complaint, where a measure’s purported compliance with 
international obligations may not insulate it from challenge. Had 
the Appellate Body stayed more faithful to the text of the TBT 
Agreement, it would have avoided teeing up such a potentially 
significant legal conflicts.
While it is true that the SPS and TBT Agreements seek to 
extend the application of GATT ‘general exemptions’ principles 
to product standards, both are meant to go well beyond conven-
tional GATT market access and non-discrimination disciplines. 
A key feature of this extension lies in the obligation common to 
both the agreements that measures not be more trade-restrictive 
than necessary. This common obligation invites WTO panels to 
assess the proportionality of a measure, and requires respon-
dent Members to adopt feasible and less restrictive alternative 
measures, where such measures have been identified clearly by 
complainants. The Appellate Body has distanced itself from this 
proportionality standard, perhaps because it represents a concept 
relatively alien to a GATT analysis. Unfortunately, the use of and 
abuse of GATT principles in SPS and TBT case law has yielded 
a more intrusive analysis than that contemplated by the SPS 
and TBT Agreement drafters. This comes at a significant cost: 
environmental regulations with trade-distorting effects tend to 
be struck down for the very reason that they distort trade. This 
is tautological. Inasmuch as the Appellate Body has elected to 
avoid applying proportionality standards by affording a good 
measure of deference to a respondent Member’s stated or desired 
regulatory level of protection, such deference matters not where 
panels consistently find that contested measures fail to satisfy 
a necessity analysis. These Members would surely prefer hav-
ing their environmental objectives preserved, even if a more 
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searching enquiry into the existence of a viable alternative 
requires them to amend certain aspects of their regulations.
Taking a step back, it cannot be said that the Appellate 
Body’s struggle to properly analyze environmental regulation 
is supported by any of the theories outlined in Section II. The 
Appellate Body has not reverted to first order GATT principles 
as a means to either blunt or embrace the DSU’s expansive juris-
diction, or because there is a fundamental conflict between WTO 
obligations and international environmental law obligations. 
Indeed, the Appellate Body has previously sanctioned the use of 
trade-distorting environmental conservation measures in prior 
rulings without destabilizing the global trade regime. Rather, I 
have sought to show that first order GATT principles, which are 
ingrained in the WTO’s institutional memory, filter through to 
WTO and Appellate Body dispute settlement reports.
poSSible reForm initiativeS
HuMaN reSourceS
WTO and Appellate Body Secretariat staff are trained to 
detect circumvention of tariff bindings, in breach of non-dis-
crimination and market access principles. They are conditioned 
to treat stated justifications for these breaches with a healthy 
dose of skepticism. These staff, in turn, can regularly influence 
the legal analysis contained in panel or Appellate Body reports. 
That WTO panel and Appellate Body reports reveals a high level 
of comfort with the “belt and braces” disputes on market access 
restriction, while openly struggling with the precise contours of 
the GATT, SPS and TBT agreements, would suggest that those 
very skills that make a legal officer adept at dispensing with 
highly technical aspects of a dumping or countervailing duty 
investigation do not lend themselves easily to an environmen-
tal regulation dispute. These latter disputes cannot be resolved 
in a technical vacuum, at the expense of fully appreciating the 
myriad scientific nuances and fine political balancing embodied 
in environmental regulation. There is no easy fix to this problem. 
Moving forward, a more diversified pool of legal officers, featur-
ing individuals with stronger science and environmental studies 
training, may offer fresher perspectives yielding more cohesive 
WTO trade and environment dispute reports.
autHoritative iNterpretatioNS
Beyond human resource reforms, I have already that the US 
has sought to rectify the balance of power within the WTO by 
refusing to sign off on Appellate Body member reappointments. 
Curbing the Appellate Body’s legislative prerogative by way 
of authoritative interpretations represents a more democratic 
reform initiative. Problematically, such interpretations are nearly 
impossible to pass for the same reason that the US is vested with 
a de facto block on Appellate Body member staffing: institu-
tional voting requirements favor decisions taken by consensus. 
Reaching consensus on anything these days is a tall order now 
that the WTO counts upwards of 164 Members.
iN-diSpute SaFe HarborS
One final reform initiative that may prove be easier 
to implement lies in the ‘safe harbor’ provisions of the SPS 
and TBT Agreements for standards conforming to qualifying 
international standards. Members seeking to reach meaning-
ful agreements on environmental regulation need not be held 
hostage by either a rampant Appellate Body or the looming 
collapse of the WTO negotiations pillar. A critical mass can 
come together to promulgate qualifying international standards 
in international organizations outside the WTO legal frame-
work, which may subsequently be relied upon in disputes as 
presumptively valid. The WTO domestic regulation disputes of 
the future may well focus on the contours of qualifying interna-
tional standard bodies. 
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The safe harbor insulating such measures from challenge under, for instance, 
the GATT. No similar presumption applies with TBT measures, notably 
because the TBT’s relationship with the GATT is uncertain. Id. I note, in 
this respect, that measures deemed consistent with the TBT are not ‘carved 
out’ from the GATT in the manner prescribed by SPS art. 2.4. As a so-called 
“Annex 1A” Agreement, the TBT Agreement is deemed lex specialis to the 
GATT pursuant to the General Interpretative Note to Annex 1A to the WTO 
Charter. But this does not altogether exclude the GATT’s application, when 
raised concurrently in a dispute. See Marceau & Trachman, supra note 10, 
at 424-25.
135  TBT, supra note 13, at art. 2.4.
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136  SPS, supra note 12, at annex A.3.
137  See Appellate Body Report, United States — Measures Concerning the 
Importation, Marketing, and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, ¶ 30-32, WT/
DS381/AB/R (adopted June 13, 2012) (illustrating the United State’s position 
on how the AIDCP was not an international standardizing organization because 
it is not international within the meaning of TBT, does not engage in standard-
izing activities and is not an organization, but a international agreement).
138  See European Communities — Trade Description of Sardines, ¶ 223, WT/
DS231/AB/R (adopted Oct. 23, 2002) (explaining how standards adopted by 
international bodies do not have to be by consensus); TBT; coDex alimentariuS 
commiSSion, proceDural manual–rule xii 1, 17 (21st ed., 2013) (referencing 
majority voting where no consensus is reached); SPS supra note 13; see also A. 
Mattoo & P. Sauve, Domestic Regulation and Service Trade Liberalization 70 
(World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2003).
139  SPS, supra note 12, at art. 2.3.
140  TBT, supra note 13, at art. 2.1.
141  Compare SPS, supra note 12, at annex A.5, with Jeffery Atik, On the 
efficiency of health measures and the appropriate level of protection, reSearch 
hanDbook on env’t, health, & the wto 116, 116-17 (Geert Van Calster & 
Denise Prévost ed., Edward Elgar 2013) (explaining that a better measure would 
pertain to the residual risk tolerated upon a measure’s implementation).
142  SPS, supra note at art. 5.5; See Panel Report, Australia — Measures Affect-
ing Importation of Salmon, ¶ 8.115, WT/DS18/RW (adopted Mar. 20, 2000).
143  See Panel Report, United States — Measures Affecting the Production 
and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, ¶ 7.244, WT/DS406/R (adopted Apr. 24, 2012) 
(affirming that this was the view of the US/Clove Cigarette panel, which was 
overturned by the Appellate Body); see Donald Regan, Regulatory purpose 
in GATT Article III, TBT Article 2.1, the Subsidies Agreement, and elsewhere: 
Hic et ubique, reSearch hanDbook on env’t, health, & the wto 41, 61-74 
(Geert Van Calster & Denise Prévost ed., Edward Elgar 2013) (criticizing, the 
Appellate Body’s transposition of GATT likeness principles on TBT art. 2.1).
144  See EC/Biotech, supra note 123, at ¶ 7.381-.393 (citing “in the event that 
the different elements could not be divided, the panel considered that the SPS 
Agreement would control”); see text, at note 128.
145  Appellate Body Report, United States — Measures Affecting the Produc-
tion and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, ¶ 104, WT/DS406/AB/R (adopted Apr. 24, 
2012). See text at notes 107-9 for the four criteria.
146  Appellate Body Report, United States — Certain Country of Origin 
Labeling (COOL) Requirements, ¶ 293, WT/DS384/AB/R (adopted July 23, 
2012); see also Gabrielle Marceau, The New TBT Jurisprudence in US — Clove 
Cigarettes, WTO US — Tuna II, and US–COOL, 8 aSian J. oF wto & int’l 
health l. & pol’y 1, 12 (2013) (explaining that the Appellate Body likely did 
so in an attempt “to preserve the balance of the TBT Agreement and its place in 
the WTO Agreement as a whole....”
The Appellate Body went on to say that it also did so in an attempt to keep 
the “Appellate Body’s explanation that the ‘balance’ of interests intended 
by the drafters of the TBT Agreement between the right to regulate and the 
reduction of unnecessary obstacles to trade must be found within Article 
2.1.[....] [and] the approach allows the Appellate Body to make sense of the 
fact that no GATT Article XX defense exists under the TBT Agreement and, 
in particular, under the non-discrimination provisions of Article 2.1.”
147  See EC-Hormones, supra, note 33 (explaining the complainant’s duty to 
establish a prima facie case).
148  See generally, Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis, Burden of Proof in 
Environmental Disputes in the WTO: Legal Aspects, 18 eur. enerGy & envtl. 
l. rev. 112, 112-40)ee, for instance, orld of InterToolkit for Policyg of WTO 
legal obligations erminations,mportsMarch 27-28, 2008), at pp. 1-er p (2009) 
(discussing the role of the burden of proof in establishing the constituent ele-
ments of a GATT violation, including notably that the imported and domestic 
products at issue are alike).
149  See Appellate Body Report, US/Gasoline, supra note 117, at ¶ 29 (accept-
ing that clean air is an exhaustible natural resource).
150  See Appellate Body Report, US/Shrimp, supra note 118, at ¶ 134 (accept-
ing that sea turtles are exhaustible natural resources).
151  See Appellate Body Report, Brazil — Measures Affecting Imports of 
Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 210, WT/DS332/AB/R (adopted Dec. 17, 2007) (explaining 
the relational nexus between the effects of a measure and its stated justification 
needed to satisfy the GATT Article XX “necessity” standard).
152  See Marceau & Trachman, supra note 10, at 368, 373 (referencing the 
debate as to whether recent GATT cases have dispensed with this proportional-
ity standard).
153  See Appellate Body Report, US/Shrimp, supra note 118 at ¶ 136 (explain-
ing the relational nexus between the effects of a measure and its stated justifica-
tion needed to satisfy the GATT Article XX “related to” standard).
154  See Appellate Body Report, US/Gasoline, supra note 117 at ¶ 29 (dis-
tinguishing between the violations of GATT Art. III and the GATT Art. XX 
chapeau).
155  See EC/Asbestos, supra note 126 (meeting the chapeau, obiter).
156  Appellate Body Report, US/Shrimp, supra note 118, at ¶¶ 175-76.
157  Id. at ¶¶ 181-84.
158  Id. at ¶ 166 (illustrating that the Appellate Body makes this point in rela-
tion to “unjustifiable discrimination” although the unilateral nature of the US 
measures informed much of the Appellate Body’s analysis of art. XX).
159  Appellate Body Report, United States — Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products — Recourse to article 21.5 of the DSU by Malay-
sia ¶ 124, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/RW (adopted Nov. 21, 2001, DSR 2001).
160  See Sanford Gaines, The WTO’s Reading of the GATT Article XX Chapeau: 
A Disguised Restriction on Environmental Measures, 22 u. pa. J. int’l l. 739, 
804-20 (2001) (arguing that the Appellate Body, in the original proceedings, 
had effectively created a requirement to negotiate a multilateral regime in order 
to pass the “unjustifiable discrimination” limb of the GATT Art. XX chapeau); 
but see Robert Howse, The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A 
New Legal Baseline for the Trade and Environment Debate, 27 colum. J. envtl. 
l. 491, 508-9 (2002) (contending that the Appellate Body did not impose a self-
standing duty to negotiate separate from the broader obligation to avoid unjustifi-
able discrimination when seeking to derogate under GATT art. XX.)
While the Appellate Body ultimately championed Howse’s view, a plain 
reading of its ruling in the original proceedings unquestionably imposed a 
requirement upon the United States to negotiate international conservation 
agreements.
161  See e.g., EC/Fur Seals, supra note 125 (explaining that no precedent exists 
yet for the SPS Agreement, although such disputes may arise in the future); see 
Marceau & Trachman, supra note 10, at 422 (highlighting even then, panels 
regularly exercise judicial economy on the GATT claims, often depriving the 
Appellate Body of the ability to “complete the analysis” for want of a sufficient 
factual record). I will discuss pertinent SPS developments from the previous 
decade before turning to the more recent TBT case law.
162  Although it is possible that more comprehensive import bans would prompt 
the Appellate Body to resurrect its least restrictive means standard, pursuant to 
which Members are required to use the least inconsistent measures reasonable 
available to it when enacting trade-related measures. Under such a standard, a 
PPM-related import ban could be less trade restrictive, while still producing 
less trade-restrictive effects. The problem with this standard is that it has never 
been applied as anything other than a crude cost-benefit tool, relied upon to 
condemn on those measures that openly or outwardly violate core principles 
of the WTO Agreements. See Alan O. Sykes, the Least Restrictive Means, 70 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 403, 415-19 (2003). Whether or to what extent such a standard 
could be applied to resolve more difficult questions linked to a country’s desired 
level of regulatory protection is questionable. A related distinction can be drawn 
between PPMs and non-product related (NPR) PPMs. There is little question 
that WTO disciplines apply to product-related PPMs. A more contentious issue 
is whether or to what extent a Member can extraterritorially condition entry 
to its market on compliance with morally-loaded NPR PPMs. The Appellate 
Body has adopted somewhat of a “see no evil, hear no evil” approach to this 
contentious issue, by glossing over them in its findings. In US—Shrimp, for 
instance, it deemed the issue moot given the migratory nature of sea turtles. 
See US—Shrimp, supra note 119, at 133. Whether or to what extent a least 
restrictive means standard will be rolled into the permissibility of resorting to 
extraterritorial measures in future disputes will be an interesting development, 
and one that could add some bite to an otherwise toothless standard.
163  Laura Nielsen, The WTO, Animals and PPMs, 128 (Martinus Nijhoff, 2007) 
(discussing the scope of the SPS Agreement).
164  Appellate Body Report, EC-Hormones, supra note 33; EC/GMOs, supra 
note 123.
165  See EC/GMO, supra note 123, at ¶ 7.68, (noting that in one dispute, a panel 
ignored the relevance of the Biosafety Protocol, which drew criticism in an ILC 
study and that particular panel report was not, unfortunately, appealed to the 
Appellate Body); see Martti Koskenniemi (Chairman), Int’l L. Comm’n, Frag-
mentation of International Law; Difficulties Arising from the Diversification 
and Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) 
(mentioning that whether or to what extent treaties outside the Codex, OIE or 
IPCC can legislate relevant international standards is presently an open issue 
on which the Appellate Body has yet to determinatively weigh in). It is recalled 
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that the Appellate Body’s approach towards non-WTO treaties under the GATT 
has been erratic. Id. At its most conservative, it deems only those treaty norms 
reflecting the “common intention of all the parties” relevant. Id.
166  See EC/Hormones, supra note 33, at ¶ 175-80 (illustrating that paradoxi-
cally the Appellate Body considers the requirement that SPS measures be 
“based on scientific principles”, at art. 2.2, as identical to the requirement that 
such measures be based on “an assessment [. . . .] of the risks to human, animal 
or plant life or health”).
167  SPS supra note 12, at art. 5.2.
168  Appellate Body Report, EC/Hormones, supra note 33, at 181, 186-87 (dis-
tinguishing between a panel’s assessment of the adequacy of a risk assessment 
versus a Member’s desired level of regulatory protection).
169  Let alone one that is both technically and economically feasible. One such 
ambiguity pertained to Australia’s stated level of protection in one dispute as 
aiming “at reducing risk to a very low level, but not to zero”, which the Appel-
late Body just about tolerated as SPS-consistent. See Appellate Body Report, 
Australia — Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples from New Zealand, 
¶ 343 WT/DS367/AB/R (adopted Dec. 17, 2010) (finding insufficient evidence 
on the record to make a finding that Australia’s measure was less trade-restric-
tive than necessary although Australia’s measure’s were found not to be “based 
on” scientific justification in another claim). See generally Jacqueline Peel, 
Of Apples and Oranges (and Hormones in Beef): Science and the Standard of 
review in WTO Disputes under the SPS Agreement, ICLQ 61(2), 427-58 (2012) 
(exploring fully the apparent counter-intuition created in Australia-Measures 
Affecting Apples).
170  SPS, supra note 12, at art. 11.2 (wording the obligation equivocally rather 
than an outright obligation, “should” as opposed to “shall,” but in practice 
panels have always sought the advice of experts in SPS disputes). Note that the 
TBT requirement, at art. 14.2 (“may”) veers closer to the wording of the more 
neutral wording of the DSU. Id.
171  See Australia — Apples, supra note 172, at ¶ 215.
172  See Appellate Body Report, United States — Continued Suspension of 
Obligations in the EC — Hormones Dispute, ¶ 230, WT/DS320/AB/R (adopted 
Nov. 14, 2008) [Hereinafter EC/Hormones] (finding general studies on the car-
cinogenic properties of estrogen to justify import bans on six specific hormones 
were deemed insufficiently specific in follow-on hormones litigation).
173  Appellate Body Report, Japan — Measures Affecting the Importation of 
Apples, ¶¶ 144-47, 162-63, WT/DS245/AB/R (adopted Dec. 10, 2003); see also 
EC/Hormones, supra note 175 at ¶ 675 (noting that surprisingly, a third area in 
which Members have failed to prevail relates to an SPS provision on the insuf-
ficiency of scientific evidence, which authorizes Members to base their SPS 
measures on “available pertinent information.”).
This provision allows Members some degree of precaution in adopting SPS 
measures. Id. No respondent Member to date has successfully demonstrated 
an absence of sufficient scientific evidence — particularly where a relevant 
international standard exists. Id. This is so despite the Appellate Body’s 
statement that such precautionary measures can be based on “a qualified 
and respected scientific view that puts into question the relationship between 
the relevant scientific evidence and the conclusions in relation to risk”. Id.
174  See EC/Hormones, supra note 33, at ¶ 529 ( holding that “[w]e [Appellate 
Body] do not believe that a risk assessment has to come to a monolithic conclu-
sion that coincides with the scientific conclusion or view implicit in the SPS 
measure. The risk assessment could set out both the prevailing view represent-
ing the ‘mainstream’ of scientific opinion, as well as the opinions of scientists 
taking a divergent view”).
175  See SPS arts. 2.3 & 5.6.
Article 2.3 states “measures shall not be applied in a manner which would 
constitute a disguised restriction on international trade.” Id. Article 5.6 states 
“[m]embers shall ensure that such measures are not more trade-restrictive 
than required to achieve their appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary 
protection, taking into account technical and economic feasibility.” Id.
176  Though DSU Art. 19.1 allows WTO panels to issue specific recommenda-
tions to aid with compliance, they tend to avoid doing so (“[i]n addition to its 
recommendations, the panel or Appellate Body may suggest ways in which the 
Member concerned could implement the recommendations.”).
177  Marco Bronkers, Ravi Soopramanien, The Impact of WTO Law on Euro-
pean Food Regulation, 6 eFFl 361, 361-75 (2008) (describing the trend of 
Members, notably the EC, reporting their SPS measures as TBT measures in 
TBT Committee meetings).
178  See Panel Report European Communities — Measures Concerning Meat 
and Meat Products, ¶ 8.42, WT/DS26/ R (adopted July 12, 1999) [hereinafter 
EC-Hormones Panel Report] (observing that this manner of proceeding was 
‘the most efficient,’ referring to the panel considering the WTO-conformity of 
any SPS measure should first be assessed in relation to all SPS violation claims, 
before turning to any applicable GATT violation claims).
The Appellate Body did not disturb this on appeal. Indeed, it has adopted 
this approach in its SPS jurisprudence. See Jacqueline Peel, A GMO by 
Any Other Name . . . Might Be an SPS Risk!: Implications of Expanding 
the Scope of the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, 17 
EJIL 5 1009, 1013-18 (2006).
179  Indeed, the scope of a “technical regulation” is drafted so widely that some 
in the WTO Secretariat wryly remark that a countervailing or dumping order 
could fall within its definition. See also Marceau & Trachman, supra note 10, 
at 342-433 (providing a more diplomatic assessment by a WTO legal counselor, 
Gabrielle Marceau).
180  Id.; see also Regan, supra note 146, at 68-9.
181  See Appellate Body Reports, European Communities — Measures Pro-
hibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, WT/DS400/AB/R 
/ WT/DS401/AB/R (adopted Jun. 18, 2014). This latter dispute was framed 
principally as a TBT appeal. Id. It was disposed of as a GATT appeal once the 
Appellate Body determined that the EU legal framework for seal products was 
not a “technical regulation”. Id.
182  Appellate Body Report, US/Clove Cigarettes, supra notes 144-148, at ¶ 239.
183  Id. at ¶ 174.
184  See Appellate Body Report, US/Tuna, supra note 140, at ¶ 283 (highlight-
ing Appellate Body Report, Japan/Apples). See Japan/Apples, supra note 176.
185  Appellate Body Report, US/Tuna, supra note 140, at ¶ 297.
186  Appellate Body Report, United States — Measures Concerning the Importa-
tion, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products — Recourse to Article 21.5 
of the DSU by Mexico, ¶ 7.266, WT/DS381/AB/RW [DSR reference pending].
187  See Appellate Body Report, EC/Sardines, supra note 141.
188  See Appellate Body Report, EC/Sardines at ¶¶ 245-48 (showing the 
burden shifts to the respondent to show that the standard is “inappropriate” and 
“ineffective”).
189  See R. Wolfrum, P-T. Stoll, A. Seibert-Fohr & Max Planck, Commentaries 
on World Trade Law: Technical Barriers and SPS Measures, 221-21 (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2007). 
Particular attention would turn to the issuing international standardization 
body under such analysis. In the above-mentioned dispute on US dolphin 
conservation measures, for instance, the panel found that the US had erred 
in departing from dolphin-safe label schemes issued under the Agreement 
on the International Dolphin Conservation Program (AIDCP). The 
Appellate Body reversed this finding, on the basis that the AIDCP was not 
a qualifying “international standardizing body” because it was not “open” 
to WTO Members, as prospective membership hinged on a consensus vote. 
See Appellate Body Report, US/Tuna, supra note 140, at ¶ 398. It bears 
mentioning that international standard bodies can serve as fertile ground 
for promulgation of international environmental standards. Such standards 
are presumed “not to create an unnecessary obstacle to international trade” 
under the TBT Agreement. Somewhat tautologically, the Appellate Body 
requires these to be an “open” “international standardizing body” carrying 
out “recognized activities in standardization.” Existing international envi-
ronmental bodies could serve this role.
190  TBT Art. 2.2; see also P.C. Mavroidis, Driftin’ Too Far from Shore — Why 
the Test for Compliance with the TBT Agreement Developed by the WTO Appel-
late Body is Wrong, and What Should the AB Have Done Instead, World Trade 
Rev. vol. 12(3), 509-31 (2013).
191  Compare the wording of TBT, Art. 2.2, with the approach taken in US/Tuna 
discussed, supra note 188
192  Appellate Body Report, US/COOL, supra note 149, at ¶ 370.
193  Appellate Body Report, US/Tuna, supra note 140, at ¶ 330.
This is not to suggest that preventing harm to dolphins is in any way a fanci-
ful objective. Clearly such a consideration is compelling. Rather, I mean 
to suggest that panels should be more critical and searching when faced 
with opaquely stated desired levels of protection similar to that expressed by 
Australia in relation to its imports of apples. See Australia—Apples, supra 
note 172.
194  Assuming that the measure at issue pursues a legitimate objective (which it 
does).
195  At this stage, the Appellate Body would already have condemned the mea-
sure for failing its “calibration” test discussed above. See supra note 188.
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196  See TBT Art. 2.2 (stating that “technical regulations shall not be more 
trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective, taking account 
of the risks non-fulfillment would create.”).
197  See T.P. Stewart, US Is Correct In Blocking WTO Appellate Body Appoint-
ment, Law360 (May 27, 2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/801553/
us-is-correct-in-blocking-wto-appellate-body-appointment (summarizing, with 
approval, the US position that the Appellate Body needs to be reined in after 
exceeding its mandate in a series of disputes featuring decisions adverse to US 
trade policy)
22  Intended Nationally Determined Contribution, Republic of Indonesia, 5, 
http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Indone-
sia/1/INDC_REPUBLIC%20OF%20INDONESIA.pdf.
23  Id. at 2.
24  South Africa’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution, 6, http://
www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/PublishedDocuments/South%20Africa%20First/
South%20Africa.pdf.




26  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Senate 
Consideration of Treaty Document 102-38, https://www.congress.gov/
treaty-document/102nd-congress/38.
27  Daniel Bodansky, Legal Options for U.S. Acceptance 
of New Climate Agreement, center For climate & Global 
SolutionS (May 2015), http://www.c2es.org/publications/
brief-legal-options-us-acceptance-new-climate-change-agreement.
28  See generally COP 21, Decision CP.21 on Adoption of the Paris Agree-
ment, Section III, ¶27.
The information to be provided by Parties communicating their nationally 
determined contributions, in order to facilitate clarity, transparency and 
understanding, may include, as appropriate, inter alia, quantifiable infor-
mation on the reference point including, as appropriate, a base year, time 
frames and/or periods for implementation, scope and coverage, planning 
processes, assumptions and methodological approaches including those for 
estimating and accounting for anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and, 
as appropriate, removals, and how the Party considers that its nationally 
determined contribution is fair and ambitious, in the light of its national 
circumstances. The language mirrors that in paragraph 14 of Decision 1/
CP.20, part of the “Lima call for climate action.” Id.
29  Paris Agreement, supra note 1, at Art. 4, ¶3.
30  Id. at Art. 3.
31  See Christina Voigt, The Compliance and Implementation Mechanism of 
the Paris Agreement, rev. oF european community & int’l environmental 
l. 25(2), 161-173, 161 (2016) (stating that the Paris Agreement establishes 
“mainly administrative, procedural obligations of a legally binding nature, 
leaving the substantive content [of NDCs] to a large extent to the discretion of 
parties”).
32  See generally Kyoto Protocol, Art. 18 (stating that “meeting of the Parties 
to this Protocol shall, at its first session, approve appropriate and effective pro-
cedures and mechanisms to determine and to address cases of non-compliance 
with the provisions of this Protocol, including through the development of an 
indicative list of consequences, taking into account the cause, type, degree and 
frequency of non-compliance”).
33  See Todd D. Stern, Seizing the Opportunity for Progress on Climate (Octo-
ber 14, 2014), http://www.state.gov/s/climate/releases/2014/232962.html.
The legal form of the Paris Agreement turned out to be the same as what the 
U.S. and New Zealand envisaged: there would be a “legally binding obli-
gation to submit a ‘schedule’ for reducing emissions, plus various legally 
binding provisions for accounting, reporting, review, periodic updating of 
the schedules, etc.”; “[b]ut the content of the schedule itself would not be 
legally binding at an international level.” Id.
34  Paris Agreement, supra note 1, at Art. 4, ¶ 12.
35  Id. at Art. 13, ¶¶ 4, 5, 11.
36  Id. at Art. 14, ¶ 2.
37  Id. at Art. 14, ¶ 3.
38  Id. at Art. 15, ¶ 1-2.
39  See INDCs as communicated by Parties, http://www4.unfccc.int/submis-
sions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx (last visited November 20, 
2016).
40  See e.g., Egyptian Intended Nationally Determined Contribution 10-12.
41  See e.g., Intended Nationally Determined Contribution of Chile Towards 
the Climate Agreement of Paris 2015.
42  See e.g., Intended Nationally Determined Contribution of Chile Towards 
the Climate Agreement of Paris 2015, 17 (the Tax Reform Law 20.780, 
promulgated in October 2014, which imposes a tax on the initial sale of 
lightweight vehicles inversely proportional to vehicle performance in terms of 
CO2 emission, and starting from January 1, 2017, an annual tax benefit lien on 
CO2 produced by facilities whose stationary sources have an aggregate thermal 
power equal or higher than 50 thermal megawatts); South Africa’s Intended 
Nationally Determined Contribution 6 (developing several policy instruments, 
including carbon tax, to reduce GHG emission); Saint Lucia Intended Nation-
ally Determined Contribution under the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change 8 (proposing to reduce tax and duty for importers of fuel 
efficient vehicles and alternative energy vehicles and taxes on higher engine 
capacity vehicles).
43  See e.g., Intended Nationally Determined Contribution of the United Arab 
Emirates 2-3.
44  See e.g., Intended Nationally Determined Contribution of the Government 
of Malaysia 3 (the Tenth Malaysia Plan (2011-2015) introduced a feed-in-tariff 
mechanism in conjunction with the Renewable Energy Policy and Action Plan 
(2010) to help finance renewable energy investment, incentivize green technol-
ogy investments, and promote projects’ eligibility for carbon credits); Intended 
Nationally Determined Contribution of Mozambique to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change 9 (Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariff 
is one of the proposed measures to reduce GHG emissions).
45  Saint Lucia Intended Nationally Determined Contribution under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 8 (proposing to introduce a 
new levy to control importation of used vehicles).
46  See e.g., Republic of Guinea Intended Nationally Determined Contribu-
tion under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 12 
(Guinea proposes to evaluate the feasibility of establishing a financial mecha-
nism for the mining sector to fund the contribution to the fight against climate 
change).
47  See e.g., Intended Nationally Determined Contribution of the United Arab 
Emirates 3 (United Arab Emirates introduced efficiency standards for air-con-
ditioning units, eliminating the lowest-performing 20% of units on the market, 
and is introducing efficiency standards for refrigeration and other appliances); 
Republic of Sudan Intended Nationally Determined Contributions 5 (proposing 
to establish a labeling system for electrical appliances).
48  See e.g., Intended Nationally Determined Contribution of the Government 
of Malaysia, 3 (The National Biofuel Industry Act 2007 requires mandatory use 
of the B5 domestic blend of 5% palm biodiesel and 95% fossil fuel diesel).
49  See sections 2.1 and 2.2 (providing further discussion on the topic).
50  The 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Art. 
3(5).
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198  See WTO News, WTO Appoints two new Appellate Body Members (Nov. 
23, 2016) https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/disp_28nov16_e.htm 
(announcing the appointment of two new Appellate Body members).
It is notably that the US succeeded in blocking the re-appointment of Seung 
Wa Chang, who was replaced by Hyun Chong Kim. Chang had been criti-
cized for his role in four decisions that, in the United States’ view, “raised 
systemic concerns about the disregard for the proper role of the appellate 
body and the WTO dispute settlement system.” See Bryce Baschuk, U.S. 
Blocks Korean Judge from WTO Appellate Body, Int’l Trade Daily (May 24, 
2016), https://www.bna.com/us-blocks-korean-n57982072872/).
199  See EC/Fur Seals, supra note 125.
